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Original Article
In a 2015 American Sociological Review article, we found 
that the U.S. public is marked by three broad perspectives on 
science and religion: a traditional one, which holds religion 
in relatively high and science in relatively low esteem; a 
modern one, with the opposite point of view; and a postsecu-
lar one, which is knowledgeable about and appreciative of 
science but which is religiously devout and which rejects 
mainstream scientific accounts of evolution and the big bang 
(O’Brien and Noy 2015). Moreover, we found that these 
worldviews correspond to attitudes about controversies 
related to science and religion, such as stem cell research, 
independently of other antecedents of public opinion, includ-
ing race, socioeconomic status, gender, and political ideol-
ogy. An important implication of this and other recent 
research is that the science-religion boundary is an area of 
cultural rather than epistemological conflict (Baker 2012; 
Evans 2013; Evans and Evans 2008; Johnson, Scheitle, and 
Ecklund 2015). This suggests that perspectives on science 
and religion may be associated with deeper divides in public 
opinion. As central institutions in American public life, elites 
often invoke scientific and religious knowledge and author-
ity in public controversies. Consequently, individuals’ views 
of science and religion may correspond to their sociopolitical 
attitudes in far-reaching ways. However, little research to 
date has examined how public orientations toward scientific 
and religious understandings fit into American political cul-
ture more broadly.
In this article, we extend our analysis of perspectives on 
science and religion in the United States to determine the 
extent to which they map onto public attitudes about a 
broad array of social, political, and economic issues. We 
address two related questions: (1) Do perspectives on sci-
ence and religion divide public opinion about issues that 
are not directly related to science or religion? (2) If so, are 
the differences issue specific, or do they extend across 
domains? The results suggest that individuals who are ori-
ented toward either science or religion hold differing atti-
tudes about nearly every issue we investigate. However, 
individuals whose worldviews blend science and religion 
stand apart in surprising ways, which suggests that this 
third perspective is not located on a conventional liberal-
conservative spectrum.
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Abstract
Elites often mobilize science and religion to support opposing positions on issues ranging from abortion to families to 
criminal justice. However, there is little research on the extent to which public preferences for scientific and religious 
understandings relate to public opinion about these and other controversies. The authors analyze how perspectives on 
science and religion map onto public attitudes about a wide range of social, political, and economic issues. Using General 
Social Survey data, the authors find that individuals oriented toward either science or religion hold differing attitudes in 
nearly every domain investigated. However, individuals whose worldviews incorporate both science and religion stand 
apart in surprising ways, which suggests that this third perspective is not located on a conventional liberal-conservative 
spectrum. Previous research has identified religious-scientific perspectives as a basis for polarization about issues that 
intersect science and religion, but the authors find that the conflict is far more widespread.
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Religion, Science, and Public Opinion
Despite the paucity of scholarship on how perspectives on 
religion and science correspond to public opinion, there is 
ample research on the social, political, and economic atti-
tudes of religious Americans. These studies show that reli-
gious people tend to hold conservative social and cultural 
beliefs about issues such as abortion, assisted suicide, gen-
der, sexuality, race, and deviance (Bolzendahl and Myers 
2004; Ferree et al. 2002; Gielen, van den Branden, and 
Broeckaert 2009; Hinojosa and Park 2004; Rothwell and 
Hawdon 2008; Whitehead and Baker 2002). However, stud-
ies have also linked religiosity to progressive attitudes about 
topics including the economy, the environment, and human 
rights (Davis and Robinson 2006; Kearns 2013; Swartz 
2013). Thus, although religious belief is often associated 
with a conservative political ideology, a religious worldview 
may lead to progressive attitudes in certain domains.
Researchers have also found that trust in science is higher 
among self-described liberals (Gauchat 2012) and that 
scientists, especially social scientists, disproportionately 
hold liberal social views (Gross and Simmons 2009). 
Nevertheless, some scholars view organized science as a 
racialized and gendered system, which discounts and mar-
ginalizes non-White, nonmale voices and experiences 
(Benjamin 2013). This suggests that scientifically inclined 
individuals may hold relatively conservative beliefs about 
issues related to gender, sexuality, race, and other topics that 
may challenge White, male hegemony. Taken together, 
existing studies on science suggest that the sociopolitical 
attitudes of scientifically minded Americans may be domain 
specific.
Data
We analyze data from the 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 
waves of the General Social Survey (GSS) to examine 
whether and how perspectives on science and religion map 
onto U.S. public opinion. The GSS is a nationally representa-
tive survey of noninstitutionalized U.S. adults conducted 
biennially using a multistage area-probability sampling 
frame. The GSS contains questions about a wide range of 
social, political, and economic attitudes, which we use as 
dependent variables in a regression analysis, and which are 
summarized in Table 1. Sample sizes for dependent variables 
vary according to the survey’s split-ballot design and because 
of missing data. We use questions about science knowledge 
and attitudes along with questions about respondents’ reli-
gious beliefs to measure religious-scientific perspectives. 
GSS data also contain detailed information on respondent 
characteristics, which are control variables in our analysis. 
Table 1 summarizes independent and control variables for 
the 3,640 cases with complete information on these items 
(1,318 from 2006, 811 from 2008, 289 from 2010, 336 from 
2012, and 886 from 2014).
Dependent Variables: Social, Political, and 
Economic Attitudes
Dependent variables are organized into seven domains. 
When consecutive survey questions were asked about a sin-
gle topic using a common response metric, we used factor 
analysis to scale the items. Three of the scales had Cronbach’s 
α values less than .60. In supplemental analysis, we exam-
ined scaled items separately and reached similar conclusions 
to those we discuss below. The first domain we investigate 
focuses on issues often framed in relation to human life, 
including abortion, contraception, capital punishment, eutha-
nasia, and suicide. A second set of outcomes focuses on gen-
der and sexuality and includes questions about gender roles, 
divorce, sexuality, and sex education. A third category exam-
ines attitudes about race and civil liberties and contains 
questions about affirmative action, causes of Black-White 
differences, and civil liberties for various social groups. A 
fourth set of outcomes focuses on attitudes about govern-
ment and social assistance and includes questions about 
government expenditures, the government’s role in reducing 
inequality, and taxes. A fifth category of outcomes measures 
attitudes about criminal justice and contains questions about 
drug laws and the use of force by police. A sixth category 
contains attitudes about children and schools, including 
child-rearing practices, traits respondents value in children, 
and whether prayer should be allowed in public schools. A 
seventh set outcomes examines personal well-being and 
interpersonal trust and includes measures of self-reported 
health, happiness, excitement about life, and about the extent 
to which respondents believe others are helpful, fair, and 
trustworthy.
Independent Variable: Perspectives on Science 
and Religion
To capture perspectives on science and religion, we repli-
cated our earlier latent class analysis (LCA) using more 
recently available data (O’Brien and Noy 2015). In survey 
contexts, LCA detects underlying groups of respondents 
on the basis of patterns of observed responses (Magidson 
and Vermunt 2001). Although this “types-of-respondent” 
approach differs from the “types-of-variables” approach 
(i.e., factor analysis) we used to create several scales of 
dependent variables for our regression analysis, the pur-
pose of the LCA is to identify unobserved worldviews 
related to knowledge of and attitudes about science and 
religion. In contrast, the aim of the factor analysis is to 
reduce the number of dependent variables for a more par-
simonious investigation of sociopolitical attitudes. 
Combining these approaches allows us to examine the 
extent to which individuals’ orientations toward science 
and religion, two critical sources of knowledge and author-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 
We conducted our LCA with Mplus software using 20 
variables that measure attitudes and knowledge about sci-
ence and attitudes about religion and religious-based knowl-
edge. These items are summarized in Appendix Table A1. 
Attitudes about science are measured as four- and five-point 
ordinal variables. These come from survey questions that 
asked (1) whether science creates more opportunities for the 
next generation, (2) whether science makes life move too 
fast, (3) whether science should be supported by government 
funding, and (4) whether the benefits of science outweigh its 
costs. Science knowledge is measured using 14 true-or-false 
questions about scientific concepts and methods such as 
radioactivity and experimental design. Two questions about 
areas of contested knowledge, the big bang and evolution, 
are critical points of distinction between latent classes.
Indicators of religiosity included a four-point ordinal 
measure of the intensity of respondents’ religious beliefs and 
a nominal measure based on a question that asked whether 
the Bible is (1) the actual word of God, (2) inspired by the 
word of God, or (3) filled with myths and fables. Although 
questions about the Bible are most salient to respondents 
with connections to Christianity, self-identified Christians 
are a large majority of the sample. Furthermore, focusing on 
attitudes about religion and religious knowledge rather than 
institutional or behavioral measures such as religious tradi-
tions or attendance allows us to tap the religious values of 
respondents who do not participate in religious institutions 
but whose worldviews may incorporate religious belief. 
Analyses that contained additional indicator variables for 
religion including belief in God, belief in an afterlife, and 
confidence in clergy (summarized in Appendix Table A2) led 
to the same conclusions as those we discuss below.
The LCA identified three distinct religious-scientific per-
spectives: a traditional one with high religiosity and low 
knowledge and appreciation of science (42 percent), a mod-
ern one with high knowledge and appreciation of science and 
low religiosity (37 percent), and a postsecular one with high 
religiosity that is generally appreciative of and knowledge-
able about science but rejects mainstream scientific theories 
of evolution and the big bang (21 percent). Fit statistics for 
the LCA are presented in Table 2, and the sociodemographic 
profile of each group is reported in Table 3. Although data 
reduction techniques such as LCA generalize complex social 
phenomena into ideal types, the categories we identify are 
theoretically driven, empirically robust, and analytically use-
ful for capturing religious-scientific orientations. Although 
other typologies based on religious traditions or attitudes 
about specific scientific controversies could be used to study 
viewpoints about science and religion, the categories we ana-
lyze provide a unique approach to examining the science-
religion boundary that focuses on knowledge and belief 
rather than behavior and which does not presume a causal 
relationship between preferences for scientific and religious 
understandings.
Control Variables: Sociodemographic 
Characteristics
Our regression analysis includes controls for several relevant 
respondent characteristics. We measure religious traditions 
using mutually exclusive binary indicators for conservative, 
mainline, and Black Protestants, Catholics, Jews, followers 
of other faiths, and those who are not associated with orga-
nized religion. We measure religious attendance with an 
eight-category ordinal variable.1 We measure race using 
binary variables for non-Latino African American, Latino, 
non-Latino White, and non-Latino other race. We measure 
age in years. We measure geographic location using a binary 
measure for residents of the South. We measure political ide-
ology on a seven-point ordinal scale. We measure education 
in years and income as a natural log transformation of house-
hold income category midpoints. Finally, because we pool 
several waves of GSS data, we include binary controls for 
survey year.
Analysis
We use regression models to examine differences in public 
opinion associated with traditional, modern, and postsecular 
perspectives on science and religion. The metric of the 
dependent variable determined our choice among linear, 
binary logistic, and ordinal logistic regression models. 
Group differences discussed in the text are statistically sig-
nificant, net of control variables (p < .05). We report y-stan-
dardized regression coefficients for our key independent 
variables to facilitate comparison across models. Because of 
the large number of models we present, we do not report 
coefficient estimates for control variables or model con-
stants and cut points, which are available upon request. All 
statistical analyses use recommended GSS sampling 
weights. Descriptive and regression analyses were per-
formed using Stata software.
Table 2. Fit Statistics for Latent Class Analysis.
Number of Classes pa BIC df
1 — 96,937.811 32
2 <.01 93,160.112 65
3b <.01 92,303.741 98
4 .76 91,971.204 131
5 .76 91,848.961 164
6 .78 91,816.431 197
7 .76 91,819.745 230
Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves.
Note: The latent class analysis is based on 4,347 cases with complete 
information on indicator variables. Similar results were obtained using a 
restricted sample of 3,640 cases with complete information on indicator 
and control variables. BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
aFrom Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test.
bPreferred number of latent classes.
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Results
Table 4 contains results from regressions of public opinion 
on religious-scientific perspectives. Several overarching 
patterns are evident. First, orientations toward science and 
religion map onto public opinion in far-reaching ways. 
Moreover, the differences exist net of other political, 
denominational, and class differences, suggesting that these 
worldviews do not simply mirror other social cleavages. 
Together, these findings offer evidence of the external 
validity of the statistical clusters identified by the LCA. 
Second, traditional and modern perspectives on science and 
religion are associated with distinctive beliefs in all but one 
of the domains we investigate. Importantly, these divides 
may be a source of political polarization, as the differences 
imply disagreement about a broad range of public policies. 
Third, the postsecular attitudinal profile resembles the tra-
ditional profile in some ways and the modern profile in oth-
ers but stands apart from each other group in some domains. 
As we discuss later, the issues postseculars align with and 
break against moderns and traditionals are important to 
identify because this relatively small segment of the public 
(21 percent) may play an outsized role in shaping social 
discourse and public policy.
Human Life
The first set of outcomes in Table 4 suggests that moderns 
are generally most tolerant of humans intervening in what 
are often viewed as natural processes related to human life. 
In contrast, postseculars and traditionals each prefer that 
humans play a more limited role in this arena. For example, 
traditionals are less supportive than moderns of abortion 
rights, and postseculars are even less supportive than tradi-
tionals. Similarly, postseculars and traditionals are each 
less supportive than moderns of making contraceptives 
accessible to teenagers. Postseculars and traditionals are 
also less likely than moderns to agree that it is acceptable 
for individuals to end their own lives and that patients with 
incurable diseases have a right to die. Although moderns 
are generally most tolerant of human agency in this domain, 
they are more likely than traditionals to oppose the death 
penalty. This first set of results points to an association 
between a scientific mind-set and a belief that humans 
should be allowed to intercede in what may be seen as natu-
ral events. However, postseculars’ restrictive beliefs about 
abortion and other issues in this domain are evidence that 
appreciation and understanding of science do not necessar-
ily lead to liberal social attitudes.
Table 3. Sociodemographic Information by Latent Class.







Religious tradition  
 Mainline Protestant 0.13MP 0.19T 0.17T
 Conservative Protestant 0.25MP 0.10TP 0.50MT
 Catholic 0.29MP 0.24TP 0.18MT
 Black Protestant 0.15MP 0.01TP 0.07MT
 Jewish 0.01M 0.03TP 0.01M
 Other faith 0.04M 0.06T 0.05
 No religious affiliation 0.12MP 0.37TP 0.02MT
Religious attendance (0 = never, 8 = more than once per week) 3.68MP 2.29TP 5.35MT
Female 0.60M 0.44TP 0.57M
Race/ethnicity  
 Latino 0.17MP 0.06T 0.05T
 African American (non-Latino) 0.25MP 0.04TP 0.09MT
 Other race (non-Latino) 0.04P 0.04P 0.02MT
 White (non-Latino) 0.54MP 0.85T 0.85T
Education (in years) 12.49MP 15.17TP 14.20MT
Income (natural log transformation of household income category midpoints) 10.30MP 10.91T 10.85T
Political ideology (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative) 4.12MP 3.64TP 4.75MT
Lives in South 0.30MP 0.20TP 0.35MT
Age (in years, divided by 10) 4.75M 4.52TP 4.80M
Sources: General Social Survey, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves (n = 3,640).
Note: Significant differences among perspectives are indicated by superscript letters as follows: M = significantly different from modern, p < .05 (two-tailed 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 
Gender and Sexuality
The second domain in Table 4 includes attitudes about gen-
der and sexuality. Results indicate that compared with each 
other group, moderns hold more progressive views of gender 
roles, sexuality, pornography, and sex education. There are 
no significant differences in postseculars’ and traditionals’ 
attitudes in this area, indicating that as with attitudes about 
human life, familiarity with science does not ensure liberal 
sociopolitical beliefs.
Race and Civil Liberties
The third set of outcomes in Table 4 turns attention to race 
and civil liberties. Given their liberal views on gender and 
sexuality, it is perhaps surprising that moderns are less sup-
portive than traditionals of affirmative action. Postseculars 
are even less supportive than moderns of affirmative action. 
Yet this pattern aligns with moderns’ and postseculars’ 
greater likelihood of agreeing that African Americans can 
overcome prejudice without favors. In addition, traditionals 
and postseculars are more likely than moderns to explain 
Black-White differences in terms of innate qualities, whereas 
moderns are more likely than traditionals to attribute race 
disparities to educational opportunities and discrimination. 
This is consistent with Hunt’s (2007) finding that religious 
fundamentalists tend to favor individual over structural 
explanations for racial inequality. Our results extend this 
knowledge by showing that a religious orientation is associ-
ated with person-centered explanations of racial inequality 
independently of religious traditions.
Traditionals and moderns also take different stances on 
civil liberties. Moderns are more likely than traditionals to 
agree that atheists, communists, gays and lesbians, milita-
rists, and racists should be able to place books in public 
libraries and to speak publically. Postseculars are also more 
supportive than traditionals of these civil liberties these 
groups. Overall, this third set of results suggests that whereas 
modern and traditional attitudes about race and civil liberties 
break in mostly anticipated ways, postseculars’ compara-
tively progressive views on civil liberties contrast against 
their more conservative beliefs about life, gender, sexuality, 
and race.
Government and Social Assistance
The next set of results in Table 4 examines attitudes about 
government and social assistance. Findings are largely 
inconsistent with research that associates a religious orienta-
tion with communitarian economic attitudes (Davis and 
Robinson 2006). However, neither traditionals’ nor postsec-
ulars’ beliefs about social assistance programs are signifi-
cantly different than moderns’. In other words, traditionals 
and postseculars are not marked by uniquely egalitarian 
economic beliefs. In fact, although postseculars are more 
religious than traditionals, they are less supportive than tra-
ditionals of government efforts to reduce inequality.
The final two outcomes in this domain indicate that tradi-
tionals are more likely than each other group to expect the 
United States to go to war in the next decade, and they are 
more likely to believe that success in life is due to internal 
factors (e.g., hard work) rather than external ones (e.g., luck 
or help). These patterns are consistent with traditionals’ indi-
vidualistic views of racial inequality. However, in contrast to 
the first three sets of outcomes, religious-scientific perspec-
tives do little to differentiate public opinion about govern-
ment and its role in citizens’ lives.
Criminal Justice
Similar to other domains, moderns and traditionals differ in 
their responses to most questions about criminal justice. 
Interestingly, although moderns are less likely than tradition-
als to approve of the police’s use of force in some situations, 
moderns are more likely than traditionals to approve of 
police force under other circumstances. Furthermore, com-
pared with traditionals, moderns report that courts should 
deal with criminals more harshly. Postseculars’ opinions in 
this domain generally resemble moderns with one exception: 
despite moderns’ relatively tough-on-crime attitudes, they 
are more likely than each other group to support the decrimi-
nalization of marijuana. Thus, alongside postseculars’ con-
servative views on certain social issues, moderns’ support for 
police force in some instances and for the harsh treatment of 
criminals further calls into question the notion that science is 
invariably associated with liberal policy preferences.
Children, Families, and Schools
Moderns’ beliefs about children, families, and schools con-
trast against traditionals’ and postseculars’ in ways that imply 
broad differences in home life for these groups. For example, 
traditionals stress children’s obedience more than moderns, 
whereas moderns attach more importance than traditionals to 
children’s social acceptance and independent thinking. 
Postseculars share moderns’ emphasis on independent think-
ing but emphasize obedience more and social acceptance less 
than moderns. Furthermore, traditionals are more likely than 
moderns to view spanking as an acceptable form of punish-
ment for children. Finally, consistent with the prominence of 
faith in the traditional and postsecular worldviews, these 
groups are each more likely than moderns to approve of 
prayer in public schools.
Personal Well-being and Interpersonal Trust
The final domain examines attitudes about personal health and 
well-being and interpersonal trust. Although there are no dif-
ferences in self-reported life satisfaction, perceptions of other 
people vary across religious-scientific perspectives. Compared 
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with traditionals, moderns see other people as more helpful, 
trustworthy, and fair. Postseculars, too, report more positive 
interpersonal attitudes compared with traditionals. Together 
with their attitudes toward social assistance and race relations, 
this finding further illustrates the importance of individualism 
associated with a traditional worldview.
To summarize, Table 4 suggests that perspectives on sci-
ence and religion correspond to extensive differences in tra-
ditionals’ and moderns’ attitudes. In most, but not all, 
domains, moderns’ beliefs are relatively liberal or inclusive, 
whereas traditionals’ are more conservative or exclusive. 
However, the postsecular perspective defies this binary. 
Individuals in this category, who are familiar with and appre-
ciative of science and also deeply religious, are marked by 
sociopolitical attitudes that cannot be consistently labeled 
conservative or liberal. For example, postseculars’ attitudes 
about government spending and social assistance and about 
criminal justice are largely indistinguishable from moderns’. 
In contrast, postseculars’ attitudes about gender and sexual-
ity mostly resemble traditionals’. Yet when it comes to issues 
such as affirmative action and school prayer, postseculars’ 
beliefs stand apart from each other worldview. Overall, the 
findings indicate that religious-scientific perspectives in the 
United States correspond to deep-seated cleavages in social, 
political, and economic attitudes, which cannot be accounted 
for by religious traditions, political ideologies, or other 
sociodemographic differences.
Conclusion
There is growing evidence that the conventional assumption 
of conflict between science and religion is overstated. To the 
extent that the public does perceive discord between reason 
and faith, recent studies indicate that the divides are largely 
moral rather than epistemological. Our analysis situates 
these divisions within the broader landscape of U.S. politi-
cal culture. The findings underscore the diversity of socio-
political attitudes among religious Americans, who are often 
portrayed as uniformly conservative, and among scientific 
Americans, who are often portrayed as uniformly liberal. 
Results show that many of the most devout members of the 
U.S. public have relatively progressive views of topics such 
as civil liberties and criminal justice. Furthermore, this anal-
ysis reveals that familiarity with and appreciation of science 
is not necessarily tied to progressive sociopolitical attitudes. 
Although scholars increasingly recognize the complexity of 
the boundary between science and religion, our investiga-
tion is the first to establish that religious-scientific perspec-
tives are associated with far-reaching differences in public 
opinion. This suggests that orientations toward science and 
religion reflect a previously unaccounted for dimension of 
polarization.
Aside from the statistical patterns identified in this article, 
perspectives on science and religion are evident in the dis-
courses used to frame public debates about issues including 
marriage and families, education, biomedical research, and 
many others. For example, some groups frame access to 
abortion in terms of scientific evidence about medical and 
reproductive health, whereas others focus on religious doc-
trine about conception and humans’ role in processes related 
to life (Rohlinger 2002). Still others frame the issue by 
engaging religious beliefs about the sanctity of life together 
with scientific arguments about fetal pain and psychological 
trauma experienced by women and health care providers 
(Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Williams 2005). By enlisting sci-
ence and religion to varying degrees, these competing frames 
reflect traditional, modern, and postsecular perspectives, and 
they illustrate the consequences of these differing world-
views for U.S. political culture. A potentially fruitful avenue 
for future research may be to analyze media or policy docu-
ments or to conduct interviews to examine how the dis-
courses surrounding political issues arise and the extent to 
which publics and other stakeholders knowingly draw on 
reason and faith in support of their positions. Nonetheless, 
although other approaches to studying linkages between sci-
ence, religion, and politics are possible, our investigation 
provides new insights about widespread patterns in public 
opinion and how it relates to broadly held orientations toward 
science and religion.
Even with the large number of U.S. adults who do not 
identify with organized religion (i.e., the “nones”), we find 
that those with relatively little religious attachment are 
largely knowledgeable about and appreciative of science. In 
contrast, religious individuals differ substantially in the 
degree to which their worldviews incorporate science. Given 
this, it may be tempting to view postseculars as highly edu-
cated traditionals. Although Table 3 indicates that postsecu-
lars tend to have more schooling than traditionals, a closer 
inspection of the data suggests that the greater continuity 
actually lies between the traditional and modern perspec-
tives. Specifically, LCAs with more than three classes indi-
cate that when a fourth latent class is considered, it is 
composed of the least religious respondents in the traditional 
group and the least scientific respondents in the modern 
group. The postsecular group, however, is mostly unchanged 
both in size and in the respondents it contains. The contin-
uum between traditionals and moderns is further subdivided 
when more than four latent classes are examined. In other 
words, this suggests that the postsecular perspective is a dis-
tinctive lens for interpreting the world, not just a scientifi-
cally sophisticated version of the traditional worldview.
Findings from our analysis should be viewed in light of 
the Christian-centric nature of religious life in the United 
States. One of the variables we used to identify perspectives 
on science and religion focuses on biblical literalism and 
may therefore be most meaningful to Christians. However, 
roughly three out of every four Americans identifies as 
Christian (Gallup 2015), and questions about the Bible likely 
resonate with many religiously unaffiliated individuals given 
Christianity’s cultural embeddedness in the United States. 
12 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 
Thus, although survey items about the Bible are valuable 
measures of religiosity in the U.S. context, the cultural speci-
ficity of religion accentuates the need for cross-national 
research on perspectives on science and religion, especially 
in societies in which non-Western religious traditions and 
institutions are more prevalent.
A practical implication of this study is that individuals in 
the postsecular category may have an outsized capacity to 
influence public policies, social discourses, and electoral 
politics. Traditional and modern views on science and reli-
gion are held in comparable numbers and pull attitudes about 
many issues in opposing directions. Although the postsecular 
perspective is less common, support among postseculars on 
issues that divide traditionals and moderns may create a 
majority or plurality among the public. This suggests that 
democratic institutions in the United States may depend dis-
proportionately on postsecular preferences. Moreover, 
because of their relatively high socioeconomic status and the 
political sophistication this implies, postseculars may be an 
especially vocal and visible minority, further reinforcing 
political and cultural divisions. Ironically, this may reify the 
narrative of conflict between science and religion despite 
these individuals’ tendency to draw on both of these ways of 
knowing.
Perhaps the most vexing question raised by this research 
is, how do we interpret the relationship between perspectives 
on science and religion and public opinion? It may be that 
views of these two sources of knowledge and influence spill 
over across domains to inform other social, political, and eco-
nomic beliefs. However, the opposite may also be true, and 
sociopolitical attitudes may drive orientations toward science 
and religion. A third possibility is that perspectives on science 
and religion and sociopolitical attitudes are each manifesta-
tions of broader cultural viewpoints. This analysis provides 
an intriguing set of results that demonstrate that social cleav-
ages related to science and religion extend far from the inter-
section of these institutions, although it cannot disentangle 
the underlying causal relationships because of the cross-sec-
tional structure of the data we use. Although this investigation 
documents the breadth of the attitudinal divide associated 
with religious-scientific perspectives, further study is needed 
to pin down the mechanism linking orientations toward sci-
ence and religion to public opinion about such a wide array of 
topics. More work is needed on this intricate cultural land-
scape, but this article demonstrates the importance of per-
spectives on science and religion for understanding current 
divisions in U.S. political culture.
Appendix
To obtain the key independent variables for this investigation, 
we replicated our earlier LCA using updated data (O’Brien 
and Noy 2015). We used 20 indicator variables that measured 
attitudes about and knowledge of science and attitudes about 
religion and religious-based knowledge. Indicator variables 
are summarized in Table A1. To choose the number of latent 
classes for our model, we relied on Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR) 
likelihood ratio tests and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC). In Table 2, the nonsignificant LMR test from the four-
class model indicates that the three-class model best fits the 
data. However, the BIC’s minimum value can also be used to 
select the number of latent classes, and the BIC is lowest in 
the six-class model. Although the BIC may be preferable for 
LCA with continuous indicators, the LMR test is a more reli-
able indicator of fit for LCA with categorical indicators, such 
as ours (Lo, Mendell, and Rubin 2001). Moreover, the BIC is 
less reliable when there is a small number of classes and when 
class sizes are unequal (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén 
2007). Substantively, we found that including more than three 
latent classes simply divided the continuum between tradi-
tional and modern perspectives into increasingly smaller 
groups, while the postsecular category was largely unchanged. 
Ultimately, our preference for the more parsimonious three-
class model is based on a combination of statistical, substan-
tive, and theoretical considerations. Table A2 contains results 
from an alternative LCA with additional religion indicators, 
which show that the three class solution is robust to the inclu-
sion of these variables. Because latent classes are substan-
tively similar with and without additional religion indicators 
and because including the additional religion indicators 
reduces the number of complete cases for analysis by roughly 
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Note
1. Although these variables are related to the indicator variables 
for religion in the LCA, religious membership and behavior 
are conceptually and analytically distinct from the measures 
of religious belief we focus on. Conclusions from regression 
models that exclude these and other control variables are con-
sistent with conclusions from models that include controls. 
This suggests that the relationships between sociopolitical atti-
tudes and perspectives on science and religion we discuss later 
are largely independent of attitudinal differences associated 
with other respondent characteristics.
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